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Introduction 
 
 
Eritrea – Paths Out of Isolation 
Annette Weber 
Two decades after achieving independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea is back in the Euro-
pean headlines – above all for a wave of refugees arriving in Europe. At the same time, 
a recent United Nations Commission on Human Rights report accuses the Eritrean 
regime of gross human rights violations. President Isayas Afewerki sees Eritrea’s 
regional and international isolation since its war with neighbouring Ethiopia (1998–
2000) as evidence of a conspiracy between Ethiopia and influential Western states. 
Every month between three and five thousand Eritreans attempt to flee the total mobi-
lisation instituted for national defence. Reintegrating the country in regional struc-
tures could build trust and neutralise the Eritrean narrative of Ethiopian aggression 
and international conspiracy. 
 
In 2014, according to the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, 360,000 refugees left 
Eritrea, 37,000 of whom came to Europe. 
Altogether, more than 6 percent of the 
population have fled the country, despite 
Eritrea suffering neither famine nor war 
nor terrorism. It would therefore appear 
that emigration is driven by other motives. 
The main cause is in fact the potentially 
unlimited military service that was intro-
duced in 2002. Both men and women are 
obliged to complete this “national service”, 
which must officially be completed be-
tween the ages of eighteen and fifty. While 
the duration is supposed to be limited to 
eighteen months, it can in reality last ten 
years or more. Apart from national defence, 
citizens may be ordered to work in agri-
culture, roadbuilding or mining. For the 
Eritrean government in Asmara, national 
service therefore represents a significant 
economic factor. 
In the interests of creating a national 
identity transcending ethnic ties, the 
government has taken to rotating con-
scripts between locations (a strategy already 
applied by the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front from which today’s governing PFDJ 
emerged). In combination with the lack of 
a time limit, however, the concept leaves 
young people spending long periods far 
from home without contact to their fami-
lies. Where they are rewarded at all, con-
scripts are also so poorly paid that they are 
unable to provide for a family or make any 
kind of investment in their future. 
The government, on the other hand, 
regards compulsory service as a vital safe-
guard for Eritrea’s national defence and 
independence. For the ideologists of the 
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ruling party, the country’s defence and 
autonomy form an imperative more impor-
tant than individual liberties. Fleeing the 
service is tantamount to treason, so re-
turnees must expect persecution and im-
prisonment. 
Because it is more or less impossible to 
leave the country legally, a dense network 
of organised traffickers has arisen specifi-
cally serving Eritreans. A range of methods 
are involved. In “normal” trafficking, refu-
gees are taken to Israel or Libya via Sudan. 
But traffickers also make money by kid-
napping refugees and blackmailing their 
families in Eritrea. A string of beneficiaries, 
including members of the border police 
and the Eritrean and Sudanese armed 
forces, members of nomadic groups in 
eastern Sudan and the Sinai, and trans-
African trafficking networks, profit enor-
mously from Eritrean asylum-seekers, 
whose journey and ransom cost upwards 
of $10,000. 
Background 
Eritrea achieved independence in 1993, 
after thirty years of fighting against Ethio-
pian rule. The Eritrean and Ethiopean lib-
eration movements were originally closely 
linked, having jointly toppled communist 
military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam 
in 1991. This led to hopes of peaceful co-
existence following Eritrea’s secession, for 
which ideal preconditions appeared to 
exist. The two states shared an interest in 
regional trade, while Ethiopia wished to 
use the Eritrean ports of Massawa and 
Assab after losing its access to the Red Sea 
through the secession. 
But only five years after Eritrean inde-
pendence, war broke out between the two 
allies – over exactly those supposedly 
shared interests, such as Ethiopian access 
to the sea. The conflict quickly escalated, 
with border disputes leading to occupation 
of territory by both parties and air strikes 
on each other’s airfields. The war lasted two 
years and cost about one hundred thousand 
lives, before ending as a “frozen conflict”. 
The Algiers Agreement of 2000 and 
the 2002 decision of the Eritrea Ethiopia 
Boundary Commission (EEBC) delimiting 
the border created the formal precondi-
tions for peace. Yet Ethiopia refuses to this 
day to recognise the proposed border line 
and continues to occupy Eritrean territory. 
Neither the African Union nor the UN nor 
bilateral partners demand that Addis Abeba 
observe the agreements and implement 
binding decisions. Ethiopia is one of the 
West’s closest allies in the “war on terror” 
and valued as a stable (albeit repressive) 
regional power in the Horn of Africa. The 
AU even has its headquarters in Addis 
Abeba. Ethiopian pre-eminence creates a 
situation where the West is much more 
conciliatory towards Ethiopia than to other 
countries in the Horn of Africa, generally 
turning a blind eye to repression, human 
rights violations and anti-democratic mea-
sures. In fact the states in the region are not 
far apart in the relevant indices of human 
rights, political freedoms and democratisa-
tion. The Asmara government, in turn, sees 
Ethiopia’s refusal to implement valid agree-
ments, in conjunction with the attitude 
of Western states, as a wholesale betrayal. 
Human Rights and Liberties 
Repression spiralled in Eritrea following 
the war of 1998 to 2000, with Isayas Afewer-
ki instrumentalising the external enemy 
Ethiopia and the West’s “complicity” to 
largely suspend civil liberties, democratic 
mechanisms and rule of law structures. 
Instead, Afewerki established an auto-
cratic one-party regime under his rule. He 
was, like his cousin Meles Zenawi in Ethio-
pia, initially the leader of the national 
liberation movement before assuming the 
presidency after independence in 1993. The 
parliamentary and presidential elections 
scheduled for 2001 were cancelled, and the 
constitution adopted in 1997 never came 
into force. To this day political decisions are 
promulgated by presidential decree. 
Shortly after the war a group of Afewer-
ki’s closest advisers, the so-called G15, 
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criticised his policies as “illegal and uncon-
stitutional”. Eleven of them were detained, 
and it remains a mystery where they are 
being held, whether they will ever face 
charges, and whether they are even still 
alive. According to the UNHCR report, dis-
appearances, torture and detention without 
trial are common practice in Eritrea. 
In 2001 President Afewerki closed all in-
dependent newspapers and had a number 
of journalists arrested. According to Repor-
ters without Borders, sixteen journalists 
were still in prison in 2015, and Eritrea 
has occupied last place in its regular World 
Press Freedom Index for the past seven 
years. 
The Economy 
Investment in the future of the population 
has been sacrificed to the imperative of 
security. As in the rest of the continent, the 
Eritrean population is young, with more 
than 60 percent under 35 years of age. As 
already mentioned, many regard military 
service as an odious burden rather than a 
legitimate and necessary patriotic duty. 
More than 70 percent of the population 
work in agriculture, which contributes 
less than 10 percent of GDP. Eritreans live 
largely from subsistence farming, livestock 
herding and fishing. Conscripts doing their 
national service also work on state-run 
farms. The mining sector has grown rapidly 
in recent years, with China and Canada 
most strongly involved in the country’s 
gold and copper mines. Russia and Turkey 
have also shown interest in the sector. The 
mining expansion was responsible for a 
jump in GDP growth from 1.3 percent in 
2013 to 4.5 percent in 2014. The relatively 
high price of gold and copper in 2015 
means that the government in Asmara can 
expect strong foreign exchange revenues. 
But with almost all resources channelled 
into the defence budget, Eritrea’s economy 
lags far behind its potential. The inflation 
rate is estimated to be 11 percent. 
Remittances from migrants represent 
an important source of revenues, both for 
private households and for the government. 
In that context, growing numbers of Eri-
trean refugees arriving in Europe guarantee 
a steady flow of cash to the homeland. 
Eritrea introduced a diaspora tax to fund 
national reconstruction, and for a time 
this represented an important pillar of the 
government budget. The levy took 2 percent 
of the income of diaspora Eritreans, mostly 
collected by embassies without violating 
international law. But when the UN im-
posed sanctions in 2011, it became illegal 
to collect taxes abroad. The regime now 
instead demands payments to be made in 
Eritrea itself, treating the tax as a develop-
ment levy enabling the state to invest in 
infrastructure without becoming depend-
ent on foreign donors. 
Regional Situation and Outlook 
In the Horn of Africa the Intergovernmen-
tal Authority on Development (IGAD) is 
an important regional organisation, espe-
cially as a conflict mediator and integration 
motor. However, Eritrea suspended its 
membership of IGAD in protest after Ethio-
pia’s 2006 military intervention in the 
Somali civil war. Asmara applied to rejoin 
in 2011, but has yet to be readmitted. In 
response to the Ethiopian intervention, 
Eritrea granted asylum to the leadership 
of the “Islamic Courts Union”, which gov-
erned Somalia from June to December 
2006. The UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea 
and Somalia also accuses the Eritrean gov-
ernment of having supplied military and 
financial support to the jihadist al-Shabaab 
militia in Somalia. This led to UN and EU 
sanctions against Eritrea. Eritrea has thus 
acted as a spoiler in the region, whose other 
states support the anti-Shabaab mission of 
the African Union (AMISOM). 
The conflict between Eritrea and Ethio-
pia is deadlocked and it is unlikely that 
they will be able to “thaw” it themselves in 
the foreseeable future. In view of the large 
numbers of refugees, however, a solution 
for Eritrea is urgently needed. Above all, 
the lives of the population need to be im-
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proved. The country is part of a region, and 
use should be made of the regional mecha-
nisms both for conflict mediation and for 
trade and economic integration. Regional 
integration of Eritrea could defuse the 
threat scenario of external intervention 
and thus delegitimise the regime’s policies. 
This would contribute to transforming 
Eritrea from regional spoiler to construc-
tive actor. 
The African Union could assume an im-
portant function by for example assuming 
a security guarantee for Eritrea. The inter-
national community would need to in-
crease pressure on Ethiopia to implement 
the Algiers agreements. In return Eritrea 
could be expected to curtail its military 
service and engage constructively in the 
region. 
The international community could 
assume the role of a guarantor of regional 
integration, and should work to neutralise 
the Eritrean conspiracy narrative. But to 
reduce Eritrea’s mistrust the West will have 
to pursue a more balanced policy towards 
the different countries in the Horn of 
Africa. 
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